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Understanding the Model of Rules: Toward a
Reconciliation of Dworkin and Positivism
I. Introduction
In his essay The Model of Rules,' Professor Ronald Dworkin argues
against a theory of law which he attributes to H.L.A. Hart and
a school called "positivism." The positivist is said to embrace three
tenets. (1) The laws of a community are rules, distinguished by the
manner in which they were adopted or developed. (2) Faced with a
hard case-one not covered by a legal rule-a judge must decide it by
exercising his "discretion"; that is, he must amend an old rule or
write a new one, looking for guidance outside the law. (3) Someone
has a legal obligation when a legal rule requires him to do or forbear
from doing something, so if a judge decides a case by exercising dis-
cretion he is not enforcing a legal obligation. Dworkin maintains that
all three tenets are unacceptable, but his chief target is (1)-the con-
ception of law as a system of rules whose membership is determined
by a generally accepted test. The doctrine of discretion and theory of
legal obligation turn out to be unwanted implications of the model
of rules applied to judicial decisionmaking.
Dworkin's strategy against the model of rules is to establish: (A)
that the law includes "principles," which are not rules; and (B) that
no generally accepted test can settle whether a principle is or is not
law. It is remarkable that contributions to the model of rules debate
have dealt exclusively with (B), attempting to produce some criteria
for the legality or non-legality of principles. They have touched only
tangentially, if at all, on Dworkin's thesis (A) that principles are an
essential part of the law. It is remarkable because, in The Model of
Rules at least, thesis (A) is the argument for (B). Granted, (B) may
be true though (A) is false; there may be no good reasons for treat-
ing principles as law, yet decisive reasons why no master test could
pick out all and only the rules of a legal system. But if Dworkin has
failed to show that the conception of law as a system of rules is un-
tenable so that an adequate model of law must include principles,
1. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967), reprinted as Is Law
a System of Rules? in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSO'HY 25 (R. Summers ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as Dworkin]. Page numbers in brackets refer to the Summers collection.
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then his case against the master test is undermined. This Note is a
defense of the model of rules against (A), Dworkin's thesis of legal
principles.
His brief for principles is in outline as follows:
1. Judicial opinions in hard cases allude to principles and policies,
which are not rules but which are reasons for results.
2. Principles might be:
(a) considerations that judges refer to as a matter of personal
predilection; or
(b) "binding" on judges in the manner of legal rules; .e.,
considerations that judges must take into account as in-
dicating a result.
3. The doctrine of discretion forces the positivist to treat prin-
ciples as in 2 (a), while a denial of discretion permits one to
embrace 2 (b).
4. The positivist is unable to show that principles cannot "bind"judges; and without principles no rules would be "binding."
5. If principles are "binding standards" they are law, so when
judges rule in hard cases on the preponderance of principles
they enforce legal obligations.
Obviously this is not an argument that principles are law. (In 4, the
affirmative point is premised upon a bald assertion that principles will
supersede established legal rules, and the "objections" to principles
are posed by straw men.) But it is a compelling invitation. The cru-
cial move occurs at 3, where Dworkin asks his reader to abandon the
doctrine of discretion and with it the denial that judges enforce legal
obligations in hard cases. These are unhappy positions, and one might
be persuaded, if not convinced, to drop them and the model of rules
as well. By the same token, however, Dworkin's invitation to treat
principles as law is less compelling if one can accept the model of
rules without adopting unacceptable views.
This Note maintains that the model of rules gives a satisfactory
account of hard cases, and that Dworkin's alternative should be re-
jected. Of course, if (as he believes) "positivism" takes the position
that law is a system of rules exclusive of Dworkin's principles, then
this Note is a defense of positivism in one of its forms. But a defense
of positivism so taken is one thing; a defense of any particular legal
positivists may be another. To secure the latter, it might be argued
that Dworkin has simply mistaken the positivists' ideas-that Hart,
and others who think that law is essentially a system of rules, in fact
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shun the second and third tenets of Dworkin's "positivism" and hold
instead some more palatable views. That is possible, but it is not the
present approach. While the model of rules as developed below is
consistent with Hart's work, there is no need that he or any other legal
theorist does or would so understand it; Dworkin claims success not
only against Hart's but against any conception of law as rules without
principles. The argument here is that Dworkin claims too much. This
is not to say that he has misunderstood his known adversaries and so
missed the mark against positivists. Rather, Dworkin has not demon-
strated the model of rules as such to be fatally defective or untenable,
and so has not refuted positivism as he conceives it. Therefore, sub-
sequent talk about the positivists need not be taken as alluding to
any particular individuals, and Hart will be referred to only for pur-
poses of understanding Dworkin's contentions.
To be discredited are Dworkin's analyses of hard cases, principles,
and legal rules. The conceptions of law and the legal process that
emerge from them lend credence to his charges that the model of
rules is unacceptable. The foundation for a correct understanding
of these topics is laid in the section immediately following. In sub-
sequent sections it is shown that insofar as Dworkin gives any coherent
description of hard cases they are analyzable in terms of rules of law
and legal rules; that none of Dworkin's principles can, without being
linked to a rule, determine someone's legal obligations, and so cannot
justify a result in a hard case or indeed in any lawsuit; and that
Dworkin's erroneous belief that the model of rules precludes a satis-
factory account of hard cases and legal obligation is attributable to
his misunderstanding of validity and the nature of legal rules. Again,
it should be emphasized that this Note does not deal directly with
such issues as whether any more satisfactory analysis can be given of
principles, and whether the admission of principles into the inventory
of a legal system precludes a separation of what is law from what is
not. This Note is rather directed to the narrower question of whether
some form of the model of rules might survive Dworkin's attack, and
the word "principles" should always be understood to mean prin-
ciples as he conceives and describes them.
I. Rules of Law, Legal Rules, and Decision
In this section a distinction will be drawn between "rules of law,"
and "legal rules." Two important qualifications must be made at the
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outset. In the first place, it is not pretended that Anglo-American
lawyers invariably use these terms in the ways described here. But it
is suggested that much of their language so conforms, that tie dis-
tinction is important, and that attention to it is necessary if certain
features of law are to be properly understood. Secondly, this Note
leaves open the question whether "rules of law" and "legal rules," or
some equivalents, must appear in any adequate theory of individua-
dion. That is to say, these are not held to be necessary elements in any
theoretically unexceptionable division of the total content of a system
of laws into smaller units of legal material. Rather, the distinction
is drawn in order to mark certain kinds of entities to which lawyers
frequently refer. "Rulings," "legal rules," and "rules of law" are ex-
pressions whose verbal resemblance invites confusion, and a correct
understanding of the model of rules depends upon careful differen-
tiation among the things they denote.
A "ruling" is the decision or result in a particular case. It belongs
only to the case for which it is handed down, and is explicable by in-
dicating which of the parties "won" or "lost." A rule, on the other
hand, is not a result. Though it is sometimes said that a decision
"produced" a rule, when lawyers and others make such statements
they have in mind the status of the ruling as precedent, and are
alluding to part of the explicit or implicit rationale for the ruling
or result.
Lawyers talk of "rules" in diverse contexts, and some uses of the
word are technical. A "rule" to show cause, for example, is probably
just a contraction of "ruling"; it is, at any rate, one of those special
uses of the word which should not be troublesome. Sometimes lawyers
distinguish "legal rules" from "rules of law." Although the terminol-
ogy is not rigorous, there is a tendency to give the name "rule of law"
to statements like "the use and release of hydrocyanic acid constitutes
an ultra-hazardous activity," and "a seal imports consideration," while
calling "legal rules" such statements as "a carrier by water may ter-
minate its special liability for goods by giving actual notice of arrival
to the consignee" and "a pedestrian on the paved portion of a road-
way shall walk to the left of the center line."2 Of course, the basis
for the distinction is more important than the expressions we choose
to designate the two classes. The full statement of a legal rule con-
2. Normally there would be some provision for crossing the road-either an exception
or definition or term modifying "pedestrian."
The Yale Law Journal
veys certain information.3 Any rule can be formulated in a sentence
which (a) identifies one or more classes of human actions (e.g., walk-
ing), and, sometimes, a manner of performance (e.g., to the left);
(b) indicates by the use of a modal word (e.g., "shall") whether some
actions are required, forbidden or permitted; and (c) identifies the
person or class of persons whom the rule concerns (e.g., pedestrians).4
A rule of law does not lend itself to such expression. It resembles a
definition, or description, or instantiation of a concept-ways in which
one might respond to a request like "Give me an example of (What
is?) an ultra-hazardous activity."5 The phrase "under penalty of law"
could be appended to the pedestrian regulation as a reminder that
it is a legal rule of obligation which will be enforced by the appro-
priate public agencies. Adding this phrase to rules of law would be
an absurdity.
Rules of law stand somewhere between legal rules and rulings. In
fact, they are often the "rules" that rulings produce. This is because
a rule of law is a compendious statement of fact and law. It records
a conclusion that some set of facts-describable, say, as "the use and
release of hydrocyanic acid"-falls under a legal rule that concerns
a certain state of affairs-say, "an ultra-hazardous activity." Rules of
law do not lay down legal rights and obligations; they are predica-
tive statements. Rules of law are not parts of legal rules; they are
about parts of legal rules. In calling them "rules" we presuppose a
practice of adherence to precedent, and their rule-like quality is due
to the instruction that they supply.; Thus, they are "rules" by dint
of norms of institutional responsibility (such as one that requires
judges to treat similar cases in similar ways) which relate them to
certain official activities, especially acts of the judiciary. The im-
portance of rules of law, and why lawyers and others might treat them
as part of the law, is explained by their utility. Rules of law are a
practical desideratum where legal rules are broad in scope and where
precedent counts, for they give brief expression to inexhaustibly com-
plex relationships of fact and law; by specifying and detailing the
3. A single rule can be expressed in an indefinite number of ways. It would be mis-
leading to say that the sentences "pedestrians on the paved portion of a roadway shall
walk to the left of the center line" and "persons on foot must keep to the left of the
center line when they walk upon a paved road" state two different rules, rather than
one rule in different words.
4. M. BLtCK, The Analysis of Rules, in MODELS AND M-rAPrORS 95 (1962) at 107, 108,
A. Ross, DIRECrIVEs AND NORMS 107 (1968).
5. Of course, it might be part of a rule on the use of certain words, affecting certai
people.
6. M. BLACK, supra note 4, at 113-14.
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range of persons and situations that individual legal rules concern,
they promote certainty and uniformity in the administration of tile
law. As definitions in legal codes they save repetition and secure the
applicability of a rule where there might otherwise be doubt. Rules
of law are, perhaps, dispensable; they may not be an essential feature of
a legal system, but they are a significant practical asset.
People may comply with or violate the law, and not just "tile law"
generally, but a law or several laws. Consider the legal rule that a
pedestrian on the paved portion of a roadway shall walk to the left
of the center line. It is complied with if the statement "a pedestrian
is on the paved portion of a roadway and walks to the left of the
center line"-which may be called "the indicative of the rule"-is
true If the indicative of a legal rule is contradicted by a true de-
scription of the actions of some individual to whom the rule is ap-
plicable, then that individual has violated the legal rule. In contrast,
it would not ordinarily be said that someone had run afoul of (or
obeyed) the "rule" that a seal imports consideration. Questions of
compliance do not arise in connection with rules of law. They have
legal significance where they are tied to legal rules and thereby in-
fluence reasoning about cases coming under the law.
A legal rule is "applied" when an official acts on it, using the rule
as a source of information about legal requirements and as justifica-
tion for a ruling.8 Two decisions are crucial: (a) the decision that
the rule is applicable; and (b) the decision that the rule should be
applied. These are not usually separated; in most cases they can be,
and are, treated as one with the question of the applicability of a
rule. The two are radically distinct, however, for they turn on differ-
ent kinds of considerations. (a) A court is expected to apply a rule
to a case only after testing its stipulations against the facts of the
case; the parties and their conduct, which are before the court, must
belong to the classes of persons and actions designated in the rule.,
7. The idea and terminology are S. Krners; see CO, cEe'TUL Tunl KINo 19-.20 (1959).
This treatment of indicatives of rules is simplified. First, the indicatihe is true in one
sense if our pedestrian walks to the left only momentarily, all the rest of the thime
walking to the right. But notice that ie has violated the rule too, for a descriptiot of his
actions would also contradict the indicative. Second, of course, courts apply rules after
the facts, so the indicative statement is couched in past tease. These time factors com-
plicate the analysis somewhat, but do not vitiate it. Finally. the indicatihe is unrestricted.
referring to "a pedestrian," while application of the rule requires that the indicative
be particularized to individual pedestrians. This is again just a technicality and such
matters are discussed in works on deontic logic.
8. MacCallum, On Applying Rules, 32 TIIEORL. 196 (1966).
9. See p. 916 supra.
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So a court will entertain our traffic regulation if a sub-indicative of
the rule corresponds to a true description: "Defendant was a pedes.
trian on the paved portion of a roadway." If this sentence truly de-
scribes the state of affairs we would say that the rule is "applicable."
(b) Sometimes legal rules are applicable, but there is doubt whether
they should be applied. Suppose a defendant were found to have vio.
lated the pedestrian rule while rushing to pull a child from the path of
traffic. Most likely it would be urged that a penal law should not be
applied here regardless of its applicability. And were a penalty im.
posed the court would be faulted, not for its judgment that the law
was applicable, but for its decision to apply that law.
It was observed that the two decisions are seldom distinguished.
The applicability of a rule is a prima facie reason why it should be
applied, and in an ordinary case once an established rule is found
applicable its application follows straight away. The decision to apply
the rule is a moment in the court's move to application, but it is not
a separate step. Difficult questions, if any, concern the fit of facts to
the terms of the rule. They may be very difficult indeed if the case
is a "hard" one. But the issues raised by this type of hard case are
conceptual and linguistic (e.g., "Was defendant a 'pedestrian'?"); the
judge must decide on the factual significance of certain words and
phrases in certain contexts.
If it seems that an applicable legal rule should not be used, a judge
must come to a decision of another sort. Here the considerations
which disfavor a rule's application will not be divergences of facts
from the settled meanings of the terms of the rule. Instead, they will
include one or more social or moral values'-justice, administrative
efficiency, mercy, deeply-rooted custom, the popular will, state interest,
political ideals, the general welfare, and so on. If application of a rule
threatens important values or ends, and if the anticipated evil is judged
to exceed the good that might be realized by its application, then an
official should discard the rule for the case at hand." Conversely, in
some cases it may seem that a rule should be applied where it is not
clearly applicable; the proposed extension of a rule's use formally
10. This may seem to draw the distinction too sharply, for some legal rules invoke
value-laden concepts or standards, such as "unconscionability" in rules of contract. Ot1
might feel that decisions on such rules arc intermediate between the two noted here.
There are good reasons that count against separate treatment of these rules, but the
point is not worth arguing here. A tripartite classification is only slightly more com-
plicated.
11. If this seems to make application of a law depend on a kind of cost.benefit
analysis rather than considerations of right, "formal" justice, or the judge's duty, let
it be emphasized that these figure in too, and they may well he determinative.
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resembles the situation where use of an applicable rule is questioned,
and it requires a decision on the same grounds. Decisions on the ap-
plication of a legal rule, like decisions on its applicability, may be
tough or easy. A hard case, where estimation of the relative plusses
and minuses is difficult or where the interests seem to cancel out,
can try the wisest court. The case of the pedestrian mentioned earlier
is, on the other hand, rather easy. A court could be expected to rec-
ognize the injustice of punishing someone for heroic deeds, and to
see that if the rule were applied the very interests the rule is designed
to serve would be retarded, without commensurate benefit. These
cases calling for decisions to apply, or not to apply, established rules
are among the most interesting in law, and law school casebooks
abound in them. For simplicity, discussion has been limited to the
single-rule situation; it illustrates all of the basic features of judicial
reasoning that are presently important. Complex cases, where estab-
lished rules of unquestioned applicability compete for adoption as
the ground of a ruling, require a series of the kinds of decisions just
examined. Where a case poses a choice among valid, competing rules,
the "best" rule is one which is of greatest importance within the legal
system and the application of which will look to realize the greatest
net benefit in terms of relevant values.12
Convenience warrants a pair of new terms. Where a single rule is
applicable but it is uncertain whether the rule should be applied,
and in cases where it is doubtful that any rule is applicable and where
no established rule of law settles the matter, it may be said that a
decision is "underdetermined." If two or more rules are applicable
(or otherwise compete for application) to a case, the law "overdeter-
mines" the decision.' 3 In underdetermined and overdetermined cases
alike, careful judgments about language and value are important steps
in the decision process. A good judicial opinion will usually indicate
the kind of decisions involved in the case.
Attention has been called to two kinds of judicial decisions regarding
12. To leave the analysis at this may seem to elide almost all of the important
questions about judicial decisionmaking-those involving the institutional responsibilities
of judges which are implicated in all decisions regarding th apphcabilty and use of
rules, and others concerning the appropriate ranking of values for various cases. But
there is no answering these questions here; complex cases are the favorites of legal
scholars, who will devote an entire essay to the dissection of just one. Space limitations
aside, the formula just stated is less vague and mysterious than Dworkin's "weighing"
of principles (see Section III infra). and the reader will have no trouble extrapolating
from the single-rule examples. Enough has been said for present requirements.
13. Overdetermined cases may or may not involve conflicting rules. In general. two
rules conflict when they indicate contrary results in some case. There are various kinds
of possible conflicts among rules, a discussion of which cannot be undertaken here.
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legal rules, and to two kinds of cases in which these decisions are dif-
ficult. Now both kinds of decisions, in both kinds of cases, can generate
rules of law. In the case of decisions on the applicability of a rule,
this is obvious. One of the samples introduced earlier is just such a
rule of law. "The use and release of hydrocyanic acid constitutes an
ultra-hazardous activity" is an answer to the question whether rules
of tort liability for "ultra-hazardous activity" are applicable in a cer-
tain case.' 4
A decision to use or to pass over a rule can also produce a rule of
law. Again, this is familiar to lawyers. In many areas of the law, but
perhaps most dramatically in criminal cases, courts decide on the ac-
ceptability in light of social and moral values of proffered justifica.
tions and excuses for violations of legal rules, and these decisions are
cited for rules of law. Civil suits can have the same kinds of conse-
quences, as a couple of well-known cases will illustrate. Plaintiffs in
Tedla v. Ellman"5 had been struck by a negligently driven car and
filed suit for damages. At the time of the accident plaintiffs were
walking on the right-hand roadway, and the pedestrian rule mentioned
above was part of the traffic code. Defendant urged that they be de-
nied recovery. He cited two established rules: that plaintiffs should
be denied recovery in tort where their conduct amounted to con-
tributory negligence, and that courts should find negligence in a
breach of statutory regulations. Acknowledging the applicability of
both rules, the court declined to apply them to plaintiffs' case. It
judged that a finding of negligence here would defeat the purpose
of the statute, which aimed to keep pedestrians from endangerment by
automobiles, and that defendant should not benefit by the rules.
Tedla v. Ellman, then, is authority for the proposition that in certain
circumstances violation of the pedestrian statute is not contributory
negligence-a new rule of law.16 Similarly, in Webb v. McGowin'7 the
court of appeals of Alabama applied a rule of doubtful applicability.
Plaintiff had once saved McGowin from harm at the cost of disabling
injuries to himself. The grateful McGowin promised him an allow-
ance for life, and paid it regularly. When McGowin died his executors
discontinued the payments, and plaintiff sued in contract. Established
14. Luthringer v. Moore. 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
15. 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939).
16. The New York Court of Appeals also refused to apply a valid and applicable rule
in Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889), producing a new rule of law
under the wills statute. The case is discussed in detail below.
17. 27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1935).
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rules provided that a subsequent promise to pay for services gives
rise to a valid contract only if the services were requested by the
promisor, and it was admitted that plaintiff had not sacrificed him-
self at McGowin's bidding. However, the court reversed a nonsuit
and ordered a trial on the facts even though, as the concurring opinion
stated explicitly, plaintiff's case seemed clearly outside the rule. Its
decision tied to the request rule a rule of law: together with moral
obligation, a subsequent promise of compensation is tantamount to
a previous request for the compensated services.
III. Hard Cases and the Need for Principles
In the previous section the differences among rulings, rules of law,
and legal rules were explored and their relationships to the process
of adjudication explained. The elaboration there was wholly con-
sistent with the conception of law as a system of rules. The present
section will examine Dworkin's argument that hard cases expose the
inadequacy of the model of rules and compel the legal theorist to
embrace Dworkinian principles. It will be suggested that the argu-
ment fails because cases of the kind that Dworkin must exhibit do
not arise for a law court, that judgments of legal obligation in situa-
tions answering to his description of a hard case are predicated on
legal rules alone, and that his alternative account of judicial decision-
making is for the most part distorted and in any event suited only
to a simple equity jurisprudence.
Dworkin's treatment of hard cases is intended both to point up
the inadequacy of Hars model and to sensitize the reader to the im-
portance of principles. He invites the reader to consider the reason-
ing of judges who are confronted with a hard case, where established
rules seem not to indicate a result, citing as examples Riggs v. Palmer
and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors.18 It is said to be the conten-
tion of Hart and the positivists that an official charged with deciding
rights and obligations of parties must in hard cases reach a result by
"exercising his discretion." Dworkin is careful to distinguish this from
a requirement that the official exercise judgment in applying the law.
"Judgment" is called for when a rule "cannot be applied mechan-
ically" because it is vague or hard to follow, or for some other reason. 0
18. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
19. Dworkin 32 [45].
The Yale Law Journal
Occasions for judgment are unobjectionable; any legal theory must
recognize that decisions about what the law requires in a given case
may be controversial, or at least initially in doubt. Occasions of dis-
cretion, in contrast, are those in which there is no law to be applied.
A judge with discretion is in a position with respect to some case
where "he is not bound by any standards from the authority of law."20
This seems to suggest a dilemma. Most would say that our courts en-
force legal rights and obligations, but if judges have discretion in hard
cases like Riggs and Henningsen then their judgments are not judg-
ments based on law. A hard case cannot turn on a legal rule because with
a rule on hand it would not be a hard case; the result would be stated
in the rule itself. Yet rules are all that the positivist will call "law."
The positivists' doctrine of discretion, therefore, entails something
that is at best counter-intuitive, and at worst subversive. It leads to
the conclusion that results in difficult lawsuits stand on extra-legal
gTounds, among which the judge may pick and choose without au-
thoritative guidance, and that the results are not judgments of pre-
existing legal rights, but follow acts of ex post facto judicial legislation.
There is, according to Dworkin, an alternative to positivism. Judges
in Riggs, Henningsen, and like cases reach results after citing various
principles and policies. Now principles and policies-i.e., moral re-
quirements and social goals-are more or less relevant to wide ranges
of cases, and there will always be some for the judge when rules fail
him. Moreover, the judge will find principles and policies differing
among themselves in weight or importance. He weighs those that tend
to favor plaintiff's position against others that favor defendant and
the preponderance determines who shall prevail. Principles, then,
determine directly the result or ruling in a hard case.2 1 Granted, the
20. id. at 35 [48].
21. This is an important point, and Dworkin's position here is so unusual that some
comment seems desirable. Moral and social goods are usually thought of as justification
for a law, rather than as justification for a ruling in a court case. Rulings, ill turn, are
not justified by principles and policies, but by laws that serve principles and policies,
Indeed. Dworkin sometimes lapses into this conventional analysis. (For example, he
says at 38 [51] that principles and policies justify changes in legal rules.) But there Is
no doubt about his intentions. (See the statements quoted at notes 32 and 39 infra.)
Principles are to serve as the law in hard cases. Their result.justifying role (if they have
one) is what puts principles on a level with legal rules, and legal rules are law par
excellence-" the cutting edge of the law," as Dworkin says. It would seem, in fact,
that Dworkin must attribute a result-justifying function to principles, rather than the more
familiar rule-justifying function. If principles and policies justified the adoption of new
legal rules in court, as they do in the legislature, then Dworkin would have to demon-
strate that nonetheless courts do not legislate in hard cases-that this rule-creating
activity differs from a legislature's law-making. For unless the rule-creating of courts
were fundamentally different from that of legislatures, Dworkin could not say (a) that
in hard cases courts enforce pre-existing legal obligations without implying (b) that it
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official will often have to use judgment in such matters, for reckoning
with principles can be controversial, but this is nothing like discretion.
And if principles and policies are as much law as legal rules, the prob-
lem of discretion disappears.
This matter of discretion is the primary reason for Dworkin's dis-
comfort with the model of rules and the motive for his alternative
model. A situation in which the positivist credits the judge with dis-
cretion, a "hard case," Dworkin says, is one that "is not controlled
by an established rule."22 Now what is the significance of this, if it is
true? The answer is problematic, if only because it depends in part
upon the cases that fit the description, and the description is unclear.
Equally unenlightening is Dworkin's restatement of Hart's position.
According to Hart, he says, "if someone's case is not clearly covered
by [a valid legal rule] (because there is none that seems appropriate,
or those that seem appropriate are vague, or for some other reason)
then that case cannot be decided by 'applying the law.' It must be de-
cided by some official, like a judge, 'exercising his discretion,' .
manufacturing a fresh legal rule or supplementing an old one."23 But
later he says that Hart's arguments, turning on "the fact that some
rules of law are vague ... and that some cases arise (like Henningsen)
in which no established rule seems suitable," imply "only that judges
must sometimes exercise judgment in applying legal standards."2 4
Vacillation of this sort-between "discretion," which is said to dis-
credit the model of rules, and "judgment," which is regarded as in-
nocuous-is not merely uninformative. It perplexes, and the perplexity
arises in a main line of Dworkin's reasoning. A fatal defect in the
positivists' analysis, Dworkin claims, is the doctrine that there are
cases in which an official has discretion. So when it is said that these
hard cases are those in which "a judge runs out of rules,"23 the obfus-
cation invites a search. Just which cases are these?
It is clear where not to look. One of the two kinds of hard cases
discussed earlier does not qualify here at all. This is the overdeter-
mined case, which is covered by more than one valid legal rule. Far
from finding that no rule fits or is sufficiently clear, the official con-
the same sense legal obligations pre-exist the stalutes which purport to establish them.
One who found (b) untenable would find good grounds for rejecting (a), and it is (a)
that Dworkin is concerned to secure with his principles.
22. Dworkin 34 [47].
23. Id. at 17 [29].
24. Id. at 34 [47].
25. Id. at 35 [48].
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fronts a number of clearly applicable rules. And it would make no
sense to say that in such circumstances the judge must manufacture
a new rule to decide the case. Nor does he write exceptions into rules
-that are not used, for Dworkin insists that instances of non-use are not
e3 ceptions.20 So those acts of judicial legislation which Dworkin dis-
cerns in the model of rules, and which he finds so objectionable, be-
long to underdetermined cases. And these are not ordinary cases where
rules are unclear as to their applicability or stipulations, so that judg-
ment is needed; these are radically underdetermined cases in which
a judge is "out of rules." Dworkin says that such cases arise often. But
it seems, to the contrary, that they never occur at all.
Suppose someone attempts to recover losses at the track by bringing
suit against the tout who gave him a bad tip, and can point to no
established rule which makes touts liable. Is this a hard case? Must
the judge weigh principles and formulate a new rule? That does not
seem necessary. To be sure, there will be a ruling that he has failed
to make out a cause of action, but it would be a distortion to say that
there is now a legal rule concerning the obligations of touts toward
their clients. Countless suits are dismissed because the plaintiff cannot
find a legal rule to stand on, even if principles are on his side, and no
court is therewith "manufacturing a fresh legal rule or supplementing
an old one."
It is true that there are unnumbered cases in which rules are, in
some sense, manufactured or supplemented. But the senses are trivial,
and the "new" rules are not justified by an appeal to principles. For
example, in one sense a court may state a "new" rule by reformulating
an old one in different words (e.g., the way the rule concerning pedes-
trian traffic was reformulated earlier 27), and since any rule has an
indefinite number of possible formulations, so many cases might be
taken as laying down "new" rules. Or, a court might "manufacture"
a rule which conjoins two or more established rules, but which has
not been recognized and applied previously. Suppose a school district
brings suit against the parent of a high school freshman for the re-
placement cost of some lost books. There are two established rules:
(a) a schoolchild who loses a loaned book incurs a debt to the school
district in the amount of its replacement cost; and (b) parents are
liable for the debts of their minor children. Is this a case not covered
26. See pp. 929-30 infra.
27. See note 3 supra.
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by an established rule?28 Yes, in one sense it is. But the court decides
in favor of the district, citing the rule that parents are liable to the
school district for the replacement cost of loaned books lost by their
minor children. Has the court manufactured a new rule, or reached
a result after attending to the weights of principles? It has done neither,
but simply transformed rules with a theorem of logic.
There are also cases for which no rules are stated in the literature,
but which are covered by established rules. Such a case is analogous
in relevant ways to prior cases where decisions have turned on rela-
tively narrow rules. Reasoning to the rule of the instant case is some-
times called "inductive." It is, at any rate, a matter of noticing some
general legal rule that embraces all of the precedent rules and covers
the case at hand. A fully-described example would be tiresome, and
unnecessary since schematic expression of the idea is easy. Precedent
cases may be represented by sequences of letters, where "A," "B,"
"C," . . . stand for salient facts, and "X" and "Y" designate rulings
for plaintiff and defendant respectively. The rules of the cases are
implicit in the facts and results, and the following table would give
a schematic portrayal of the state of the law in this area:
Case 1: facts ADFG, result X
Case 2: facts ABEH, result X
Case 3: facts ACFG, result Y
Case 4: facts ACDG, result X
Case 5: facts BDEF, result Y
Now suppose that the case before the court is ABCD. It meets Dwor-
kin's description of a "hard case" in one sense, but it is obvious that
there is an established legal rule that covers the case.2 The rule, which
courts have been using all along, indicates a ruling for plaintiff. For
fact A is necessary and sufficient for X, unless fact C has been found;
but A and D are sufficient for X notwithstanding fact C. Again,
in one sense the judge has "run out of rules," and must "manufac-
ture a new one." But once again logical considerations alone indicate
an appropriate rule, which was implicit in the courts' practice.
Finally, there is yet another sort of case which, from one point of
view, is not controlled by an established rule. Suppose a statute re-
quires that, within a given jurisdiction, motor vehicles be operated
28. See M. BLAcK, supra note 4, at 125-28; A. Ross, supra note 4, at 166.67 and 174-76.
29. There is more than one.
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with lighted headlamps between sunset and sunrise, and it is estab-
lished in a long line of decisions that drivers who fail to comply with
this statute are negligent as a matter of law. For the first time a driver
of a go-kart, running it after sunset without lighted headlamps, collides
with and injures a pedestrian. The statute defines a motor vehicle as
"any mechanically-propelled vehicle, intended or adapted for use on
roads." The court must decide whether the go-kart driver is negligent
as a matter of law. Is this a hard case? It is true that the decision is
underdetermined, in the way discussed earlier. But this case is none-
theless covered by legal rules. There is simply no established rule of
law as to whether a go-kart is a motor vehicle. 0 To say that it is "a
hard case" when the first go-kart driver is brought before the bench
is only to evince uncertainty as to whether or not a go-kart is a motor
vehicle. It is not that the motor vehicle rule cannot be applied and
that a new one must be manufactured, for, supposing the kart driver's
case is held to fall under the rule, the law is not thereafter said to
contain two rules which require the use of headlights after sundown
-one applicable to go-karts, and another applicable to motor vehicles.
The foregoing may be summarized as follows. Dworkin has pro-
posed that "hard cases" escape the model of rules and confront the
positivist with a grave difficulty; the positivist cannot argue that the
judge decides a hard case on legal grounds, because the judge is out
of rules; so he must say that the judge has discretion and decides the
case by legislating new legal rules or amendments to old ones. To test
this proposition, cases have been considered in which there were
arguably no "established" rules and "new" rules were needed. Now,
obviously, when Dworkin says a judge is out of rules in some case
he cannot mean that there is just no relevant legal rule, because plain-
tiff's inability to find any favorable legal rule would keep him out
of court altogether. So Dworkin must mean that in a hard case the
judge is out of rules in some other sense. But then hard cases posed
no difficulty for the positivist. In two kinds of cases a new rule was
"manufactured" in a sense so trivial as not to amount to legislation.
These were instances in which the "new" rule is merely a reformula-
tion of an old one, and in which the "new" rule is an amalgamation
of two or more old ones. There were, in fact, only two creditable
varieties of "the hard case." One calls for reasoning from analogy, or
30. See pp. 914-17 supra. Adapted from Burns v. Currell, 2 Q.B. 433 (1963).
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else something like induction from a set of restricted rules to a broad
covering rule, but it does not reach beyond established rules. The
second kind of hard case requires not a new legal rule but a new rule of
law, and therefore involves no more than careful judgment in apply-
ing extant rules. Nowhere has the judge been forced to legislate in
deciding the case; nowhere has there been a glimpse of tie positivist
bogey of discretion.
It might be objected that these speculations have proceeded upon
a caricature of Dworkin's hard case model, and that a positivist has a
judge exercising discretion in any case where there is no established
rule that is applicable on its face. In those circumstances, it is said,
a judge must either (1) use an old rule, or (2) use a new one. If the
former, some rule must be amended to be applicable; if the latter, the
judge has fabricated a rule; in either case, the judge legislates ex post
facto. This objection, if it does not just restate the original obscuri-
ties, can be taken in various ways, relative to the meanings of "estab-
lished rule" and "applicable." If a rule is applicable on its face, then
it can be applied "mechanically," as Dworkin says, provided that there
are no overriding reasons why it should not be applied. Now case?
where rules cannot be applied mechanically are, on Dworkin's own
account, occasions for judgment; they are not occasions of discretion;
consequently, they do not undermine the model of rules. For failure
to exhibit a favorable legal rule will keep the case out of court alto-
gether, or makes it one of the putative "hard cases" just discussed, all
of which turn up exercises of judgment rather than judicial legislation:
So perhaps the objection rests on some conception of an established
legal rule, and a hard case is one where no applicable rules are "estab-
lished" in quite the appropriate sense. But there seems to be no satis-
factory account of what it means for a legal rule to fail of establish-
ment in the requisite way. (a) If it signifies that in some form the rule
has not been previously stated by some authority, then this is too severe,
for it denies that a rule can be reformulated, or that a conjunction of
two legal rules is yet a valid rule. (b) If it means that the rule has not
been previously recognized by a court or legislature, taking "recogni-
tion" here to be explicit, the over-restrictiveness remains, for it has
been seen that recognition may be implicit. And whether a legal rule
has been recognized implicitly is a question for careful judgment rather
than fiat. (c) If it means that the rule has not been applied to some pre-
vious case on all fours with the hard case, then the criterion confuses
legal rules with rules of law and eradicates the distinction between
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judgment and discretion. There appears to be no sense of "established"
suited to the needs of Dworkin's argument.
Perhaps the remarks about (c) in the preceding paragraph will not
satisfy someone who contends: "So much the worse for the rule of
law/legal rule distinction. In talking about legal rights and obliga-
tions the question is whether operators of go-karts (to use an earlier
example) are under a legal obligation to use headlights. That is the
question to the court for which the established rules have no answer."
The contention rests on a mistake, however. There are at least two
questions before the court:
(1) Is the operator of a motor vehicle under a legal obligation
to use headlights?
(2) Is the operator of a go-kart the operator of a motor vehicle?
Because answers to (1) and (2) imply an answer to
(3) Is the operator of a go-kart under a legal obligation to use
headlights?
the court need not find a rule of obligation that contains "the operator
of a go-kart" among its terms. Overlooking this bit of logic and col-
lapsing (1) and (2) into (3) may lead to the belief that there is no
legal rule that imposes the subject obligation on kart drivers. But
that is the mistake. The motor vehicle code might provide such a rule.
However, suppose that the point can be amended. It might be urged
that legal rights and obligations pertain to individual persons (such
as the defendant before this particular court) and not to classes of
persons (such as go-kart operators). Someone might then say that the
law distributes rights and obligations among individuals, so that if
no established rule declares whether defendant had the obligation in
question then a judge who decides in the affirmative is, by the posi-
tivists' account, creating a legal obligation ex post facto. Now it is
undeniable that individual persons bear legal obligations, but this is
not because proper names are somehow written into the law. Given
the fact that defendant was operator of a go-kart, he had an obliga-
tion to use headlights if the correct responses to questions (1) and
(2) are "yes." Supposing (1) can be answered in the affirmative on
inspecting the vehicle code, question (2) makes the kart driver's case
a hard one. But legal obligations are established by the code; a court
does not create them by a decision on (2). First, the fact that some-
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one's legal obligations are affected by its answer does not make (2) a
question regarding legal rights and obligations. Its answer is not even
of the sort that we would expect from legal rules; it is a matter of
class membership or definition-a subject for rules of law. And sec-
ond, a decision whether the class of kart drivers is a subset of the class
of motor vehicle operators calls in any case for an exercise of judgment
rather than discretion. The term "motor vehicle" is simply vague, or
"open-textured," and, given Dworkin's observation that vagueness or
open-texture in rules can be handled by careful judgment, the decision
here merely summons that resource.
Finally, granting that courts do not really manufacture new rules
out of whole cloth, someone might stand on the point about courts
exercising discretion by "supplementing" legal rules. Earlier it was
said that judges do not modify legal rules when their decisions pro-
duce rules of law, and one could retort that rules of law are modifica-
tions of legal rules. The argument goes like this. A rule of law is pro-
duced in a case where qualified legal rules are not used, and this rule
of law can be taken as an exception to those rules. A settled rule 1h
becomes a new rule W" by writing an exception into it, and this amend-
ment qualifies as an act of legislation and so discretion. But this argu-
ment, however plausible, is not available to Dworkin because he ex-
pressly rejects the idea that occasions of non-use can be treated as ex-
ceptions to laws. A distinguishing feature of a legal rule, Dworkin
says, is the enumerability of its exceptions-they are part of a completd
statement of the role in question. Of course, he does not mean that
we could state all the occasions in which a rule would not be used.
As he says of principles, "We do not treat counter-instances as excep-
tions .... They are not, even in theory, subject to enumeration, be-
cause we would have to include ... also those numberless imaginary
cases in which we know in advance that the principle would not
hold."31 Now there are "numberless imaginary cases" in which we
know that a legal rule would not hold, and the cases we cannot even
imagine are also numberless. If principles do not have exceptions
because it is impossible to state all the cases in which they would not
be followed, then, by parity of reasoning, legal rules do not have ex-
ceptions in this sense. But rules of law are just the legal results of
applications or non-applications of legal rules. So those enumerable
exceptions that Dworkin expects to incorporate into the complete
31. Dworkin 26 [38].
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statement of a legal rule are not rules of law, but something else un-
specified. Furthermore, even if Dworkin did not subscribe to the
thesis about enumerability and exceptions, the argument about sup-
plementing rules does not show courts to enforce legal obligations
that they have created ex post facto. To have a legal obligation is to
be in a position where a law applies, and when a court applies an
established rule in a case, the so-called exceptions to rules not used
are by-products of its action. Therefore, in deciding on the basis of
an established rule the court enforces an existing legal obligation,
notwithstanding any alleged modification its decision might work on
other rules.
Hence, on any understanding of "the hard case" that would suit
Dworkin's purposes, it seems that his problem situation for the model
of rules is vacuous. What is amiss? It might be that Dworkin lacks a
clear idea of what a flesh and blood legal case involves, or else thinks
it unimportant, for his "difficult lawsuits" are hard to imagine. More-
over, Dworkin's alternative model of the judge's predicament seems
quite implausible. He talks as if litigants had to argue a hard case
out solely in terms of principles and policies, since no rules are ap.
plicable. Then he treats the judge's job as a matter of taking plaintiff's
and defendant's principles in the balance, marking the tilt, and an-
nouncing the winner. 32 No one can object that Dworkin has made it
too easy; lawyers and judges in such cases would indeed have a very
rough time. But his model of the judge's task is disturbing in what it
highlights. For example, just about any judicial proceeding could be
described as requiring a decision in favor of one side or the other, in
an utterly trivial way. Moreover, Dworkin's model seems of a piece
with certain kinds of quasi-judicial proceedings like arbitration, crim-
inal sentencing, and divorce settlement. What is significant and char-
acteristic about the conclusion of a case at law is the way it relates to
the outcomes of other cases; therein lies the core of its "legal" quality
-that it draws upon and lays down rules and reasons which are au-
thoritative guides for human activities, that it is retrospective and
prospective. Now if Dworkin's hard cases are to be heard in law courts,
32. Consider the notions implicit in these statements: "A principle like 'No man
may profit by his own wrong' . . . states a reason that argues in one direction ...
There may be other principles or policies arguing in the other direction." (Dworkht at
26 [38]); "[T]he principle is one which officials must take into account, if it is relevant,
as a consideration inclining in one direction or another." (Dworkin at 26 [39]). Ald
on the narrowness of a judge's task in a hard case: "[P]rinciples play an essential
part in arguments supporting judgments about particular legal rights and obligations."
(Dworkin at 29 [41]).
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they must arguably'resemble previous cases. But then the courts will
consider the resemblances and the rules used previously; judges would
hardly deal with them in the ad hoc manner that Dworkin envisages.
His model of judicial decisionmaking is keyed to proceedings where
precedent does not count, and where judges treat cases as isolated sets
of facts to be dealt with on their particular merits. But this is not the
stance of a judge toward a case at law; indeed, Dworkin's model is
best suited to a simplified equity jurisprudence, and therefore his
treatment of "hard cases" misses much of what is essential to "the law."
So far it appears no fault of the model of rules if the legal cases that
elude it are such as Dworkin portrays, for there seem to be no such
cases. But, in an effort to save this portion of Dworkin's argument,
it might be suggested that Riggs and Hcnningsen should be consid-
ered. While Dworkin does say that they were occasions for judgment
rather than discretion, the suggestion is still worth pursuing, since
he frequently calls them "hard cases." It is perhaps just possible that
they are the "hard cases" that are to confute the positivist's model of
law, with principles at work pointing to results where rules fail to
define the relevant legal obligations.
However, by Dworkin's characterization of the "hard case" Riggs
is on one count disqualified at once, for it involved applicable rules
of impeccable validity. The court was asked whether the protection
of "statutes regulating the making, proof and effect of wills, and the
devolution of property" should be extended to a named beneficiary
who had murdered the testator. It sought guidance from the "familiar
canon of interpretation" that statutes must be so construed as to give
effect to the intentions of the legislators, and that, where intention is
imperfectly expressed, "judges are to collect it from probable or ra-
tional conjectures only." Of course, the court declined to apply the
wills statute. The case turned not on principles in the form of com-
mon law maxims (which were cited as evidence that the legislators
deemed the matter settled), but on "rational interpretation" of legis-
lative intent. Dworkin implies as much: "In Riggs, the court cited
the principle that no man may profit from his own wrong as a back-
ground standard against which to read the statute of wills and in this
way justified a new interpretation of that statute."33 But this is mis-
leading. What is termed "new interpretation" is a rule of law-that
one who murders the testator does not qualify as his beneficiary under
33. Dworkin 29 [42].
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the statute. And' the "principles" cited in favor of this ruling were
treated as ends pursued by the lawmakers, not as the law that defined
the parties' rights in the absence of legal rules.
As to Henningsen, Dworkin's claims that "the court cited a variety
of 'intersecting principles and policies as authority for a new rule
respecting manufacturer's liability for automobile defects"3 4 are with-
out justification. All of the principles to which Dworkin calls atten-
tion are cited when the court discusses the effect of the contract pro-
vision with respect to liability of the auto manufacturer. The judges
held that "Chrysler's attempted disclaimer of an implied warranty of
merchantability, and of the obligations arising therefrom is so inimical
to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity."35
That so-called principle of "special obligation" of the auto manufac-
turer, which Dworkin believes to be "an essential link in the Henning-
sen argument,"30 is alluded to merely as a reason why "the courts must
examine purchase agreements closely." 37 Special obligations, and the
holding as well, turned on the disparity of the parties' bargaining
power, and the use of a standardized contract by the entire industry
with seeming intent to avoid statutory liability. Furthermore, the
significance of "new" as descriptive of the Henningsen rule is prob-
lematic; contracts inimical to the public good were voided long be-
fore. As to its status as a "hard case," the court hardly found itself
"out of rules." Even Dworkin is doubtful. While he claims in one
place that it was a case "in which no established rule seem[ed] to be
suitable," 38 elsewhere he says that "in Henningsen certain rules about
automobile manufacturer's liability were altered."30 Put more ac-
curately, Henningsen, like Riggs, stands for a new rule of law, albeit
a relatively complicated one. The controlling legal rule, that valid
contractual provisions may not be inimical to the public good, is an-
cient common law. Boilerplate disclaimers of a warranty implied by
statute, if not bargained for by the parties, were held to run afoul of
the rule.
Riggs and Henningsen have been worth considering because Dwor-
kin cites them when arguing, first, that "principles play an essential
part in arguments supporting judgments about particular legal rights
34. Id.
35. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960).
36. Dworkin 27 [39].
37. Henningsen. 32 N.J. 358, 374, 161 A.2d 69, 85 (1960).
38. Dworkin 34 [47].
39. Id. at 38 [51].
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and obligations" in hard cases, 40 and second, that if and only if such
principles are binding as law can it be said that "the judge in a hard
case . . . is enforcing legal rights and obligations." 41, Of course, it
would be a mistake to think that the whole dispute hangs on a certain
reading of Riggs and Henningsen. But the failure of these cases to
illustrate Dworkin's points should give pause, for he talks as if they
will do double duty, as paradigm "hard cases" and as representative
decisions with principles. However, neither of them fits his definition
of a hard case. Instead they appear to be fairly typical, if extraordi-
narily interesting, examples of a suit on legal rules, all of which were
at hand for the decision. And Dworkin would probably hesitate to
amend his definition of a hard case to include Riggs and Henningsen,
for they conflict with his model of adjudication. In neither case were
a party's rights and obligations decided on the preponderance of prin-
ciples. True, the question whether established rules ought to be ap-
plied and which ones, called for close judgment and careful reasoning;
relevant principles figured here. But in each case the disputed rights
and obligations were found in legal rules rather than in principles and
policies, and each decision purported to be a decision of law. So neither
Riggs nor Henningsen could lend any support to Dworkin's two theses
about the role of principles. There is, moreover, another reason why
he would abandon them rather than redefine the hard case. In both,
the courts' decisions came to terms with established rules, and if rules
are admitted in difficult lawsuits, then the dilemma Dworkin posed
is dissolved. A case like Riggs or Henningsen, however complex and
close, still fits the positivists' model of law and judicial reasoning.
A final observation is in order: if Riggs and Henningsen represent
the way principles give results in hard cases, then there is something
wrong with Dworkin's account of this process. He talks throughout
of a hard case as involving an either/or choice between plaintiff and
defendant. While this characterization is accurate in the sense that
the judge must decide in favor of one party or the other, a hard case
in that respect is no different from any other. On the other hand,
Dworkin denies that there could be two conflicting rules covering the
hard case between which the judge must choose. The account claims
too little, or it claims too much. Riggs and Henningsen are not pre-
sentable as sets of facts, rule-less and in search of consequences, brought
40. Id. at 29 141].
41. Id. at 31 [43].
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to court for a weighing-up of opposing principles.42 Judges took ac-
count of relevant social and moral values in deciding whether or not
the wills statute should be applied on behalf of Riggs, and in coming
to the proper conception of "public good" under the contracts rule in
Henningsen. And if any weighing was done, judges used something
more like a matrix than a balance, and the result was more like a vector
than a tip of the scales; no consideration of relevant value belongs ex-
clusively to one side or another. The magnitude of the distortion
which Dworkin's model gives to our image of judicial reasoning is
seen in his belief (i) that judges changed established rules in the
Riggs and Henningsen cases, and (ii) that they reached their decisions
to do so by weighing principles and policies which favored change
against those that opposed it.43 It has been seen that the courts fash-
ioned new rules of law, leaving established legal rules intact. But even
if Dworkin's first proposition were true, the second is simply fantastic.
Riggs' judges reasoned about legislative intent, and in Henningsen
pro- and anti-change principles are nowhere to be found. In contem-
plating difficulties raised by a case like Henningsen, a court could be
expected to give short shrift to principles for and against change as
such, in favor of deliberation on the legal positions of the parties.
IV. Principles and the Determination of Results
- The previous section attempted to show, inter alia, that there do
not seem to be any hard cases as Dworkin conceives them. But it should
be observed that he has arguments purporting to demonstrate that the
positivist is committed to the existence of Dworkinian hard cases, 44
and that earlier portions of this Note perhaps do not foreclose the
logical possibility that he might produce some suitable examples. Thus,
Cne could reject Dworkin's portrayal of judicial decisionmaking and
yet accept his indictment of the model of rules on the ground that there
are cases where in some way principles, rather than rules, settle the
parties' legal obligations)The plausibility of this weakened version
pf the Dworkin thesis depends upon the soundness of three points:
that principles, like rules, can impose legal obligations; (b) that
42. Dworkin says (36 [49]) that sets of principles can determine particular results
"[ilf a judge believes that principles he is bound to recognize point in one direction
and that principles pointing in the other direction, if any, are not of equal weight."
43. Dworkin 38-39 [51-52].
44. "[I]f a lawyer thinks of law as a system of rules . . . he will come naturally to
the theory of judicial discretion .... " Dworkin 39 [53].
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these principles and rules are distinct kinds of entities; and (c) that
in virtue of their special properties, principles impose legal obliga-
tions where legal rules cannot. What is needed, then, is to examine
Dworkin's analysis of principles and legal rules. If his analysis is faulty,
Dworkin will be unable to maintain that the model of rules can be
replaced by a more adequate model of principles, which will avoid
the paradoxes of so-called "hard cases."
Judges must run out of rules, Dworkin believes, because a rule
either controls or is irrelevant to a case. In deciding what must fol-
low from a given set of facts, a legaI rule will direct "in an all-or-
nothing fashion." If the rule can contribute anything at all-that is, if
the facts stipulated by the rule are given-then "the answer it supplies
must be accepted.""4 A rule may have exceptions, but if it does they
are enumerable; a complete statement of a rule is always possible, and
any exceptions will be part of the statement. Principles and policies, in
contrast, "do not set out legal consequences that follow automatically
when the conditions provided are met.""4 Some, in fact, do not even
indicate conditions for their application. Rather, a principle "states
a reason that argues in one direction," and it may be defeated by
"other principles or policies arguing in the other direction." T In-
stances where a principle does not prevail are not treated as excep-
tions, because "they are not, even in theory, subject to enumeration."
Dworkin finds another difference between rules and principles, en-
tailed by the first. "Principles have a dimension that rules do not-
the dimension of weight or importance."48 When principles "intersect"
the conflict must be resolved by estimating their relative weights. But
it cannot be said that one rule is favored over a conflicting rule be-
cause of its greater weight within the system. "If two rules conflict,
one of them cannot be a valid rule," and one must decide which is
valid "by appealing to considerations beyond the rules themselves."4"
Dworkin states that these two differences between rules and prin-
ciples amount to a "logical distinction." "Both sets of standards [i.e.,
rules and principles] point to particular decisions about legal obliga-
tion in particular circumstances, but they differ in the character of
the direction they give." 50 Now, there is an obvious difficulty here,
45. Dworkin 25 [37].
46. Id.
47. Id. at 26 [38].
48. Id. at 27 [39].
49. Id. at 27 [40].
50. Id. at 25 [37].
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and Dworkin seems to be vaguely aware of it, for he admits that
neither form nor function is a foolproof mark of a rule or a prin-
ciple.51 In fact, this classification problem suggests that there is no
logical distinction at all. If the asserted functional differences are
differences of degree, it can be objected that Dworkin has simply no.
ticed a variation among rules. Some rules should be applied whenever
they are applicable, and others should be applied discriminately. There
are rules whose applicability is shaded; one variety stipulates a specific
consequence if applicable, and another casts cloudy hints. There is,
indeed, no reason to stop here. There may be a third kind of rule,
with, say, narrow applicability and vague consequences, and even a
fourth kind where these attributes are reversed. Of course, the vague,
more-or-less-applicable, sometimes-not-to-be-applied rules might be
styled "principles." But a linguistic convention is not an indictment
of the model of rules; much less is it a counter-thesis. A verbal dis-
tinction, without more, allows that "principles" are just a species of
rules. The model of rules has been refined, perhaps, but not refuted.
Wanting a demonstration that there is a fundamental, generic dif-
ference between (say) vague rules and precise rules, at least in the
law, Dworkin has merely impeached the rule-exponent's lexicon. If
every distinction without a difference is questionable, it must also
be observed that not every difference warrants a distinction.
These objections are insufficient, however. Dworkin will argue
that by "rules" one must mean to exclude from the law all precepts
other than narrow, strict norms that confine a judge like iron bonds,
leaving him quite free outside their scope. And, this point aside for
the moment, it does seem that there are important differences between
legal rules and at least some of Dworkin's principles-differences which
are better brought to light at once. Principles and policies are scat-
tered throughout Dworkin's essay. The following list, omitting re-
dundancies, is exhaustive.
(1) "automobile accidents are to be decreased"' 2
(2) "securing title"53
(3) "protecting automobile consumers"' 54
(4) "no man may profit by his own wrong""
51. Id. at 28 [40].
52. rd. at 23 [35].
53. Id. at 26 [38].
54. Id. at 27 [391.
55. Id. at 23 [35] passim.
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(5) "in the absence of fraud, one who does not choose to read a
contract before signing it cannot later relieve himself of
its burdens"56
(6) "freedom of competent parties to contract"35 7
(7) "[f]reedom of contract is not such an immutable doctrine"3s
(8) "the courts will not permit themselves to be used as instru-
ments of inequity and injustice"59
(9) "courts generally refuse to lend themselves to the enforce-
ment of a 'bargain' in which one party has unjustly taken
advantage of the economic necessities of the other..."00
(10) "limiting punishment to what the legislature has stipu-
lated"61
(11) "the doctrine of 'legislative supremacy' "62
(12) "the doctrine of precedent"0 3
The members of this collection fall naturally into groups. Dworkin
identifies (1)- (3) as policies, and the rest as principles, though his
practice of using "principle" as a generic term for "principles, policies,
and other sorts of standards" has perhaps cast "other standards" into
the array. Dworkin's taxonomy will serve as a starting point, but
further discriminations will be necessary.
Dworkin is relatively clear as to how principles and policies are
to be conceived. "We might treat legal principles the way we treat
legal rules and say that some principles are binding as law and must
be taken into account by judges and lawyers who make decisions of
legal obligation."0 4 Then it can be argued that "because such judges
are applying binding legal standards they are enforcing legal rights
and obligations."6 5r "Once we... treat principles as law, we raise the
possibility that a legal obligation might be imposed by a constellation
of principles as well as by an established rule."60 These remarks sug-
gest an hypothesis that is worth testing. The law, it is usually thought,
frames obligations; a person meets his obligations by complying with
the law, and fails to meet them when he violates the law. It was shown
earlier what compliance and violation would mean with respect to
56. Id. at 24 [36].
57. Id. at 24 [361] passin.
58. Id. at 24 [36].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 26 [38].
62. Id. at 38 [52].
63. Id.
64. Id. at 29 [42].
65. Id. at 31 [43].
66. Id. at 45 [59].
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rules. But can anyone comply with a policy or violate a principle?
Such expressions sound odd, at the very least. The case of a policy
may be considered first.
Dworkin cited, as an example of a policyL "automobile accidents
are to be decreased." If policies frame obligations, how would some-
one comply with that policy? Automobile accidents are events, not
human actions, and the policy does not even purport to concern per-
sons. No indicative sentence describing the actions of a person could
count as satisfying the requirements of the policy as such. This does
not mean that the policy cannot "require" certain kinds of behavior,
however. We need (a) the proposition that a class of actions will de.
crease traffic accidents, and (b) a rule which requires such actions
of persons within the jurisdiction for which the policy is adopted.
With this, we can formulate the indicative of a rule and determine
whether or not the policy is "complied with." Inspection of (2) and
(3) will show them subject to the same analysis. Thus compliance
with, or violation of, Dworkin's policies must be understood as an
action falling under a legal rule which is tied to some policy by an
empirical proposition, and a policy requires certain human actions
only in virtue of the rule.
What about prjp4iles? The statement that "no man may profit
by his own wrong" is often cited by Dworkin. It obviously concerns
individuals, and it forbids them certain things. But "to profit" is not
a verb which identifies a class of human actions. Rather, it is an
"achievement verb," which asserts that "some state of affairs obtains
over and above that which consists in the performance, if any, of the
subservient task activity." 7 "To win" is another such verb. A person
who wins does not act in a particular way, but only enjoys a particular
status; to fight and win is not to do two things, but to have engaged
in one kind of activity with a certain result. So the principle that
fighters may not win does not proscribe an activity (such as fighting)
which someone might observe and thereby detect violations of the
principle; it rather proscribes winning, which is not a performance
at all. Similarly, the principle that wrongdoers may not profit bars
no deeds, only an outcome. If the principle that no man may profit
by his own wrong is to require or forbid or permit any human actions,
then it must be translated into a rule respecting those actions. Second
parties, such as officials, might be obligated to do certain things that
67. G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 149-53 (1949).
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would alter the state of affairs which constitutes success.0s As an al-
ternative, some rule might require the wrongdoer to do things which
would have this effect. In either case the rule is tied to the principle
by a proposition to the effect that doing what is required is a case of
eradicating the profit. What is of present importance, though, is that
the untranslated principle is, in itself, of no consequence for human
activity.
It is plain enough that an analysis of principles (6) and (10) would
have the same result. Principles and policies of the sort just discussed
may be referred to as "achievement-principles." Other principles on
the list, if they do not exactly elude this analysis, seem less amenable
to it. It is tempting to treat this as a problem of translation, and to
try to reformulate the remaining principles as something like state-
ments of goals, conditions or achievements. The project could be
carried out, but at the cost of distortion. Instead, consider (5): "in the
absence of fraud, one who does not choose to read a contract before
signing it cannot later relieve himself of its burdens." Someone familiar
with the law of contract would recognize at once that (5) is a partial
statement of a legal rule-a rule with exceptions, of course, and one
which courts may decline to apply, but a legal rule nonetheless.
Dworkin says that the positivist is inclined to treat principles as "rules
manqud."0 9 The anti-positivist, it would appear, is not averse to treat-
ing "rules manque" as principles.
Now consider (9): "courts generally refuse to lend themselves to
the enforcement of a 'bargain' in which one party has unjustly taken
advantage ... ."This is a descriptive sentence, referring to the practice
of judges in dealing with agreements to which a party was coerced in
some way. As a description, it may be more or less apt, and, in con-
nection with an obligation of judges to conform in their treatment
of similar cases, it may contribute to a decision. But no generalization
about what judges in fact do can impose an obligation on an individual
judge; much less can it obligate an ordinary citizen. The form of (7)
suggests that it should be typed with rules of law, but it is probably
an elliptical reference to the ordinary practices of courts, and so has
the same signpificance as (9)..These may be styled "synopsis-principles."
The remaining samples Dworkin calls "doctrines," and says that
they are sets of principles. He hints that they are special; the prin-
68. Reading "may" as "is permitted to" in connection with an achievement verb
strongly suggests that a particular kind of success depends upon the behavior of others.
69. Dworkin 40 [53].
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ciples making up doctrines are said to be "conservative" as against
"substantive."I 0 But this is no help, and Dworkin does not state any
of the implicated principles. Still, doctrines are principles, or allusions
to principles, and must be reckoned with. Consider, then, "the doctrine
of precedent." Dworkin wants to treat the doctrine of precedent as
"law." What would this mean? The question could be approached
by thinking of a case in which the doctrine might come into play: a
case like those discussed earlier, where a court departs from estab-
lished legal rules or rules of law, either in the interest of accepted
values, or in favor of a competing rule. Supposing the decision could
be appealed, the appellate judge would be expected to take one of
two stances: if the departure was unjustified he should declare the
appropriate law of the case, and reverse the lower court; if, on the
other hand, he agreed with the statement of law applied by the court
below, then he should ratify it and affirm the decision. But it would
not be said that he should reverse or affirm on the doctrine of prece-
dent, or on any principle thereof. It would be bizarre if a judge re-
versed, declaring, "The rights and obligations of the parties are clearly
defined by principles of precedent, and this case should have been
decided in accordance with said principles. It was not. Reversed." The
statement would be queer because departure from the principles of
precedent is not a ground for reversal. But departure from the law
may be. And a memorandum of law (say, in support of a motion to
dismiss) which listed the principles of precedent would be a lawyer's
joke, while a memorandum citing appropriate legal rules would be
quite in order. This is just because a legal rule, and not a principle
or a "constellation of principles" such as the doctrine of precedent,
imposes a legal obligation which the courts are expected to enforce.
Thus, in Dworkin's examples may be discerned four kinds of prin-
ciples or policies, three of which are different from rules.7' One
difference between a Dworkin-style principle and a rule is conspicuous.
Rules bear information about what people may, ought, or ought not,
do in certain circumstances. Principles do not-at least, not without
help from rules. Achievement-principles posit ends to be achieved
or values to be realized. Synopsis-principles state what is the general
practice of judges, or what some large set of related legal rules tends,
on the whole, to require. The content of doctrine-principles is unclear,
70. Id. at 39 [52].
71. The fourth, crypto-rules or partial statements of rules, arc probably thcrc by
mistake.
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for reasons already mentioned, but it is plain that neither do they
define legal obligations. Nor could a "constellation" of these sorts of
principles inform someone about appropriate conduct in particular
circumstances. It might be said that the run of judgments in a given
type of 'case tends to promote or retard some achievement, or that
the tendency of certain rules is to serve some end, or, more specifically,
that the doctrine of precedent links up with values of fairness and
justice. But the amalgamation of principles does not tell someone
what he ought to do or avoid.
Perhaps someone will think that this survey of principles has at-
tended too closely to the language in which they are expressed, and
that apart from their expression principles are not so queer and non-
normative. But the results accord with Dworkin's conception of prin-
ciples and policies, as shown by his own general description of them.
A principle, Dworkin says, is "a requirement of justice or fairness or
some other dimension of morality"; a policy "sets out a goal to be
reached" in the society.7- Policies state goals or achievements for the
society, and the preceding conclusions about them are confirmed. An
objection would find its grounds, if any, in this conception of prin-
ciples as requirements of morality. It would depend upon how the
notion of a moral requirement should be taken, and a long-standing
doctrine of moral philosophy can help here. At least since Kant, most
moralists have accepted an analysis of moral duty such that to say that
one ought to do something implies that he can do it. This means that
morality does not require of a person what he cannot do, and if "ought"
has any relation to "obligation" then what a person cannot do he has
no obligation to do. G.E. Moore discerned a kind of requirement of
morality such that "ought" does not imply "can," and which, there-
fore, does not impose an obligation. This he called the moral "ideal"
to distinguish it from the moral "duty." The former concerns a per-
son's inner life or what one ought to be; the latter concerns external
actions or what one ought to do.73 Lately, I.L. Humberstone has re-
examined this distinction, introducing the terms "agent-implicating
ought" and "situational ought." Only agent-implicating "ought"-judg-
ments "immediately engage the machinery of praise and blame" or
"allocate responsibility"; a situational "ought"-judgment recommends
or deplores some general state of affairs.74
72. Dworkin 22-23 [34-35].
73. G. MooRE, The Nature of Moral Philosophy, in PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 310 (1922).
74. Humberstone, Two Sorts of 'Ought's,' 32 ANALYSTS 8 (1971).
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Do the "requirements of morality" which are Dworkin's principles
concern a person's external actions, saying what he ought to do? Are
they agent-implicating? If so, why are his examples all ideals or situa-
tional oughts, requiring things that no individual can accomplish by
his own acts? On the other hand, if principles do state moral require.
ments for a person's external actions, saying what he ought to do, how
do they differ from moral rules, any of which might be legal rules?
The answers to these questions suggest inevitably that, like policies,
principles are concerned with general states of affairs or ideals. Prin-
ciples are "requirements of morality" in a special sense. But then it
is obvious that they cannot impose legal obligations, at least not di-
rectly. For it is an essential feature of law that someone has an obli-
gation to do something only if he can do it. This is recognized in the
excuse of impossibility-no person is held accountable for failing to
do what he could not do, or for doing what he could not avoid. It is
difficult to accept the idea of legal obligations concerning mental life
or hidden character. 75 So the conclusions reached earlier also square
with Dworkin's general description of principles, and exceptions to
the linguistic approach are ill-taken. Neither principles nor policies,
as Dworkin conceives them, are sources of legal obligations in his hard
cases. For principles and policies can determine such obligations only
if conjoined with a rule, and, by Dworkin's stipulation, in a hard case
the judge has run out of rules.
- A final remark may help to put things in perspective. Earlier, in
Section If, it was noticed that social and moral values are sometimes
permissible grounds for decisions whether to apply or not to apply
settled legal rules, clearly applicable or not. Dworkin's principles
look like one or two among the several kinds of values that are rele-
vant to such a decision. They are, as he says, "reasons for a result."
But this "result" is not a ruling-a decision on the case in favor of one
side or the other. Dworkin thinks so, because rulings in cases at law
turn on the legal rights and obligations of the parties, and he believes
that principles can provide these grounds. The principle-relevant re-
sult, however, is a judgment that some rule ought or ought not to be
applied in coming to a ruling. A ruling may be the upshot of prin-
ciples in connection with legal rules, where the question of applying
legal rules is appropriately raised and the principles are accepted
75. Morris, Punishment for Thoughts, 49 MONIST 342 (1965), in EssAYs IN LECAL
PHILOSOPHY 95 (R. Summers ed. 1968).
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gTounds for evaluating the rules. And if the rule in question and the
facts that refer it to principles are so obvious that their statement
would be otiose, a ruling may seem to issue on principles alone. But
the relevant rights and obligations in both cases are framed by the
rules, and principles cannot do the job. As projected states of affairs,
dispositions, descriptions, generalizations, and so on, they do not
impose obligations on the judge or on the parties.'('
V. The Availability of Legal Rules
Section III suggested that Dworkin could not produce cases which,
on the model of rules, called for acts of judicial discretion. In Sec-
tion IV it was argued that Dworkin-type principles cannot serve as
the grounds for rulings in cases where legal rules are absent because
such principles do not frame legal obligations. The present section
deals with Dworkin's analysis of rules, which is the foundation for his
belief that rules are unavailable in difficult lawsuits. If Dworkin's
analysis is wrong then his argument from hard cases is worse than
empirically vacuous; it rests upon erroneous notions about legal rules,
and only on such erroneous notions does the model of rules seem to
commit the positivist to an unacceptable account of judicial decisions
and legal obligation.
Dworkin wants to say that extant legal rules cannot help a judge
to decide a case which is not squarely covered by a rule, so when a
judge in that position looks for help he must look outside the system
of rules and decide on those grounds. This is so, lie maintains, because
(a) rules have strictly circumscribed areas of relevance in which they
admit of no deviation, and (b) one rule is no more eligible for ex-
tension than another, in virtue of the totality of rules. That is, to use
Dworkin's terminology, rules dictate results in an all-or-nothing way,
and they do not differ in importance.77
Earlier investigation of the use of rules in adjudication made out,
at minimum, a prima facie case against Dworkin's first two proposi-
tions about legal rules- (1) that they "are applicable in an all-or-
nothing fashion," and (2) that they "dictate results, come what may."
For a rule of doubtful applicability may yet be applied, and a rule
76. Confinement of the analysis to matters of obligation has left other jural relations
-the Hohfeldian powers, privileges and immunities-aside. But this narrowness is no
defect for present purposes. inasmuch as Dworkin reduces Hohfeldian relations to legal
obligations. See his remark in Dworkin at 17-18 f29].
77. See the exposition of his analysis at pp. 935-36 supra.
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may be applicable and yet not used. With what reasoning does Dwor-
kin defend his conception of rules, and impute it to the positivists?
By way of demonstrating (1) he says:
If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid,
in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not,
in which case it contributes nothing to the decision.78
Now, surely no one would deny this. For all Dworkin has said is that
an applicable rule is either valid or invalid; if valid then it states a
legal obligation, and if invalid it is irrelevant. That an invalid rule
"contributes nothing to the decision" is as much as "an invalid rule
is not valid," and it might be added that an "invalid" principle con-
tributes nothing to the decision either. It is no more than a truism,
which might be of interest to someone who did not understand our
ideas of validity and invalidity. But whatever it may reveal about those
concepts, it says nothing about the applicability of rules as such.
Dworkin follows the remarks quoted above with an illustration:
"This all-or-nothing is seen most plainly if we look at the way rules
operate, not in law, but in some enterprise they dominate-a game,
for example." The aptness of the analogy is unclear. Dworkin calls
to our attention a similarity between the "rule" of baseball that "if a
batter has had three strikes, he is out," and a rule of law that "a will
is invalid unless signed by three witnesses." But his rule about wills
is hardly a representative legal rule. It is a conclusory statement that
makes elliptical reference to many rules. Nor could it be a typical
rule for Dworkin; a few paragraphs later he says that the vastly differ-
ent first section of the Sherman Act has come "to function logically
as a rule." 79 Thus his "illustration" already has a look of impropri.
ety.80 Now Dworkin wants to show just how rigid is reasoning with
legal rules which are like baseball rules, and so he writes: "An official
cannot consistently acknowledge that this is an accurate statement
of a baseball rule, and decide that a batter who has had three strikes
is not out."8' This is as true as his remark about validity, and no more
than that does it show rules to be "all-or-nothing." The official would
be inconsistent because Dworkin's "baseball rule" is the major premise
78. Dworkin 25 [37].
79. Id. at 28 [41l].
80. For disanalogies of law and ruICs of games, see Part I of Huighes. Rules, Policy
and Decision-Making, in LAW, RVSON, AND JUSTICE 101 (G. Hughes ed. 1969).
81. Dworkin 25 [37].
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of a syllogism, of which the minor premise is "a batter has had three
strikes." Indeed, like the putative rule about wills, this baseball "rule"
is not a rule at all. Rather, it is a shorthand way of capturing a com-
plex of rules and definitions which constitutes the game, just as that
fragment of the law of wills states a criterion for valid documents
which is part of a complex of definitions, hypotheticals, and rules
about the institutional duties of officials. Again, there is no argument
whatsoever for the "all-or-nothing" of legal rules.
Next, in favor of (2), that rules "dictate results, come what may,"
there is only Dworkin's word for it, couched in the validity/invalidity
distinction. It is unnecessary to rehearse the counter-examples, or the
discussion of them. If the baseball illustration is to count as an argu-
ment for (2), then the objections of the previous paragiaph count as
well. But an additional remark is warranted by Dworkin's point about
the enumerability of "exceptions" to rules, because it might mislead.
He says that where a rule does not "dictate results" it has an exception,
and he differentiates principles on this count. Now, it might be ex-
pected that exceptions to legal rules are amenable to complete state-
ment, and the point can be conceded if legal rules is his subject. As
was seen, however, the word "exceptions" is ambiguous, and if Dwor-
kin means to include as exceptions all those particular instances in
which a legal rule would not be applicable, or in which, if applicable,
a court would decline to apply it, then his assertion is false.82 Rules
could not "dictate results" in this way.
Now, Dworkin considers his second thesis about rules and prin-
ciples-the matter of "weight" or importance-an implication of the
first thesis. With the "all-or-nothing" conception of a legal rule dis-
credited, it is well to be equally skeptical about the claim that rules
do not have varying weights or differences in prominence-a claim
that surely would surprise most lawyers. It seems that they are often
called upon to assess the relative importance of legal rules; that, in-
deed, almost any interesting problem in the law requires such delibera-
tions. But Dworkin would not dispute this fact. His contention is
rather that rules as such do not have weights, and that grounds for
ranking them lie outside the rules themselves. "Functional" impor-
tance is dismissed, as referring to the greater or more important role
of the rule in regulating behavior-its degree of use. The point is that
82. See pp. 929-30 supra.
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"we cannot say that one rule is more important than another within
the system of rules."83
Still, it is not easy to see how this point should be taken, or why, in
the unlikely event that it is true of rules, it should not be true of
principles and policies as well. Dworkin's brushoff of the functional
importance of rules will raise an eyebrow when it is remembered that
functional importance is a major consideration in testing the relative
weights of principles. When we defend a principle as part of our law,
Dworkin says, we "mention any prior cases in which that principle
was cited, or figured in the argument. We would also mention any
statute that seemed to exemplify the principle. . . . Unless we could
find some such institutional support, we would probably fail to make
out our case, and the more support we found, the more weight we
could claim for the principle."84 It seems odd that in the case of a
principle its frequent invocation bears on its weight, while the func-
tional weight of a legal rule is disqualified. Dworkin gives no reason
for this difference of treatment, and it is doubtful that any justifica-
tion can be given. For surely, in a choice between two legal rules, a
court would favor the rule with the greater institutional support, other
things being equal. If Dworkin claims that the positivists' model is
flawed because the intrinsic weights of rules do not vary, so there is
no basis of choice among them, and recommends a model of principles
because their weights differ due largely to variation in institutional
support, then he is claiming for one theory what he has without rea-
son denied to the other. If, on the basis of institutional support, courts
can say that one principle is more important than another within the
system of principles, then on the same basis courts can say that one
rule is more important than another within the system of rules.
The confusion over functional importance is unfortunate, but
Dworkin's argument that rules cannot have different weights in dif-
ferent circumstances fares no better. An obvious counter-example is
presented by any legal question; one would expect the defamation
laws to have little weight in a corporate tax problem but to be of sig-
nificantly more importance where a private citizen has been falsely
accused of immoral behavior. However, Dworkin would probably say
that for his purposes relevance is to weight as judgment is to discretion,
and that the facts of cases are something "outside the rules" anyway.
83. Dworkin 27 4O].
84. Id. at 41 [55].
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As we have seen, he proposes that a system of rules cannot confer more
importance on one rule than on another. But even this restricted claim
is clearly wrong. Indeed, of all counter-examples perhaps none is so
devastating as that which Dworkin develops against his own proposi-
tion in the course of arguing for it. This argument, like the one for
"all-or-nothing" in legal rules, deserves to be quoted in detail.
But we cannot say that one rule is more important than another
within the system of rules, so that when two rules conflict one
supersedes the other by virtue of its greater weight. If two rules
conflict, one of them cannot be a valid rule. The decision as to
which is valid ... must be made by appealing to considerations
beyond the rules themselves. A legal system might regulate such
conflicts by other rules.... [It] may also prefer the rule supported
by the more important principles8 3
The argument here is that a choice between conflicting rules turns on
which rule is valid, and that this is settled by considerations outside
the rules themselves. Moreover, Dworkin admits that these "outside"
considerations may be other rules. The argument comes, then, to a
reiteration, or an allowance, of Hart's thesis that the validity of a rule
is established by criteria which are not in the rule itself, but which
are in other rules of the legal system. On top of that, this point about
testing the validity of a rule in no way supports, but in fact refutes,
Dworkin's assertion that rules are equally important within the system.
The more important of the two rules, here at least, is just the one
which the system's other rules pick out as valid. The invalid rule, like
all invalid rules, is of no consequence in any case-a point Dworkin
made when arguing for the "all-or-nothing" use of rules. Finally, there
is what was earlier called "the overdetermined case,"8 6 and the ques-
tion whether competing rules, both valid and applicable, differ in
importance in different circumstances. Here a lawyer is likely to an-
swer in the affirmative, feeling that the variation in weight, if not in
the rules themselves, is at least related to the system of laws as a whole,
or to values associated with the rules in question. But Dworkin ignores
the fact that conflicting rules might be applicable to a case because
he considers it a problem of validity rather than the quite distinct
problem of which valid rule ought to be applied.
85. Id. at 27 [40].
86. See p. 919 supra.
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Dworkin suggests no good reason to doubt that the importance of
a rule varies in different circumstances, and that choice among valid
and applicable rules depends upon their relative importance in a
given case. On the other hand, the positivists' model of law accounts for
this phenomenon. In reflecting on the use of rules in adjudication, it
was noticed that choice among competing legal rules requires an
evaluation of each relative to its importance within the system and
the goods or evils that its application to the case might produce. These
goods and evils are understood in terms of a wide range of social and
moral values which may themselves differ in importance from case
to case.87 Evaluation and ranking of applicable legal rules is a com-
plicated and agonizing task, but lawyers tend to feel that interesting
lawsuits are just those in which such difficulties are acute. At any rate,
it is a prominent feature of the adjudicative process that valid rules
conflict and that they are ranked in particular cases. Dworkin has
pointed to nothing in the nature of legal rules which would suggest
that they cannot differ in importance within a legal system. No more
did he make plausible the assertion that legal rules are narrow and
inflexible.
His failures here are important. If the model of rules necessarily
admitted cases where a judge could find no guidance from rules simply
because no rules clearly covered them, then some doctrine of judicial
discretion might be required. But a proper understanding of the model
of rules shows that this conception of the judge's predicament is un-
founded, and Dworkin's argument to the contrary shows itself to be
a mass of confusions and non sequiturs. Earlier, reasons were given
for rejecting his claims that judges in fact run out of legal rules and
that in such circumstances they rule on the preponderance of prin-
ciples. Later, Dworkin's principles and policies were found impotent
in matters of legal obligation and so unable to ground judicial rulings.
Now it is seen that his restrictive account of the use of rules is unten-
able. On all points Dworkin has failed to demonstrate that the concep-
tion of law as rules without principles commits one to a deficient or
unwanted view of law and legal obligation. To this extent he has no
substantial argument against positivism.
87. Among the values, as we have seen, are some of Dworkin's principles and policies,
and he is correct in maintaining that these principles have the dimension of "weight."
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